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The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration:
An Application to Franchise Contracts
Christopher R. Drahozal and Keith N. Hytton

ABSTRACT
If we define the deterrence benefits from contract enforcement to be avoided harms net of
avoidance costs, we should expect contracting parties to choose the dispute resolution forum
that provides the greatest difference between deterrence benefits and dispute resolution costs.
We apply this framework to franchise contracts and conduct an empirical analysis of the
determinants of arbitration agreements among franchising parties. Although it is obvious that
contracting parties have an incentive to choose arbitration to reduce dispute resolution costs,
there have been no studies of the importance of deterrence concerns. We examine the deterrence hypothesis and find a great deal of support for it. Our results suggest that deterrence
factors outweigh litigation costs in the design of dispute resolution agreements. We find that
the probability of arbitration is significantly higher when the parties rely on implicit contract
terms for governance and compliance with those terms is difficult to ensure.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper combines two largely unconnected strands in the literature,
the economics of litigation and the economics of franchise contracts, in
an effort to shed new light on both. The economics of litigation literature
has focused on incentives to litigate a dispute-that is, ex post incentives.

The literature on the economics of franchise contracts, on the other hand,
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has attempted to explain the shape of franchise agreements as responses
to the ex ante shirking and free-riding incentives observed in the franchise relationship. Relatively little theoretical or empirical work in this
area has looked at how the choice of dispute resolution forum responds
to the classic incentive problems in franchising.' This paper takes a step
toward filling gaps in the litigation and contracts literature by examining
how the decision to commit disputes to arbitration responds to ex ante
incentives in franchising.
Contracting parties can choose, before any disputes arise, whether
to resolve all or a subset of their disputes in court or through arbitration.
We should expect such predispute agreements to be designed to minimize
the costs of their relationship. Specifically, if we define the deterrence
benefits (or governance benefits) to be avoided harms net of avoidance
costs, we should expect contracting parties to choose the dispute resolution forum that provides the greatest difference between deterrence
benefits and dispute resolution costs for every type of dispute.2 For contracting parties, the harms avoided through superior governance generally can be classified as losses due to breach of either explicit or implicit
contract terms.
We apply this framework to franchise contracts and conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of arbitration agreements among
franchising parties. Although it is obvious that contracting parties have
an incentive to choose arbitration in order to reduce dispute resolution
costs, there have been no studies of the importance of deterrence concerns. We examine the deterrence hypothesis here and find a great deal
of support for it. Our results suggest that deterrence concerns outweigh
litigation costs in the design of dispute resolution agreements. In the
franchising literature, the connection between implicit and explicit contract terms has been explored in depth. We find that the probability of
arbitration is significantly higher when the parties are likely to rely on
implicit terms for governance and compliance with those terms is difficult
to ensure.
This study suggests a rather complex relationship among dispute res1. The exception is Williamson (1985, p. 71), who stresses the "continuity" role played
by an agreement to commit disputes to arbitration.

2. This paper relies on the framework and terminology set out by Hylton (2000).
However, Shavell's (1995) analysis anticipates several of the theoretical points in that article
and in this one. In particular, Shavell shows that contracting parties can induce good
performance and thereby raise the value of the contract by switching to a more accurate
dispute resolution forum.
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olution provisions, incentive control provisions, and contract sanctions.
The choice of dispute resolution forum affects not only ex ante incentives
and dispute resolution costs. It also affects contracting costs, since parties
are more likely to leave contract provisions vague, opting for relational
governance (Macneil 1978), when they have chosen a dispute resolution
forum that can be trusted to reach value-maximizing results. On the
other hand, the parties may prefer explicit contract terms if they have
a high degree of confidence regarding the interpretation of those terms
in court.
We find that franchisors in states with franchisee protection statutes
are less likely (all else equal) to provide for arbitration than are other
franchisors. This suggests, at a minimum, that franchisors have not
viewed arbitration as a forum in which arbitrators would disregard or
misapply protection statutes to their benefit. The result is consistent with
the hypothesis that parties constrained by franchisee protection statutes
shift toward greater contractual explicitness in order to restore credibility
to the sanctioning threat.
Section 2 sets out the basic theory of arbitration agreements and
applies the theory to the franchising context. It begins with a framework
that applies equally well to torts and to contracts and then extends the
framework by incorporating the roles of contractual explicitness and
alternative contract sanctions. Section 3 sets out the empirical analysis,
based on a sample of 75 franchise agreements. Section 4 concludes.

2. ECONOMICS OF LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION

2.1. Incentives and Contract Enforcement
This section explores the economic motivations behind predispute arbitration agreements. We will assume that the parties can contract over
the type of dispute resolution forum. Their options are the "default"
litigation regime, which involves bringing suit in a court, and an arbitration regime, which may provide different levels of damage awards
and dispute resolution costs.
2.1.1. General Setting. This discussion assumes that transaction costs
prevent the parties from contracting initially over the level of care, effort,
or forbearance exercised in their relationship. Given this, they will
choose the private enforcement regime that best governs incentives. We
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assume there are no third-party effects, so the level of forbearance that
is preferable between the contracting parties is also socially preferable.
There are two parties, the potential plaintiff and the potential
defendant (for simplicity, Plaintiff and Defendant), both of whom are
risk neutral. Defendant decides ex ante whether to forbear from an act
that could harm Plaintiff. If Plaintiff is harmed, he will bring a claim
for compensation against Defendant. This framework applies equally to
tort and contract settings.3 In the tort setting, the potential defendant
decides whether to take care, and his decision affects the probability
that Plaintiff suffers harm.4 In the contract setting, Defendant decides
whether to breach a term of the contract or to reduce his level of effort
(breaching an implicit term). Let
x = Defendant's forbearance cost,
v = harm to Plaintiff,
d = damage award,

q = probability of harm to Plaintiff if Defendant does forbear,
p = probability of harm to Plaintiff if Defendant does not forbear,
a = Plaintiff's dispute resolution cost, and
03= Defendant's dispute resolution cost.
Plaintiff will bring a claim for compensation if his expected damage
award exceeds his dispute resolution cost, d > c. For simplicity, we will
assume this holds. Since Defendant will minimize his total private cost,
he will forbear if and only if his forbearance cost is less than his marginal
expected liability,
x +q(d+O)<p(d+O).

(1)

Forbearance is socially desirable when Defendant's forbearance cost is
less than the marginal social cost of his act,
x + q(v + a + 3) <p(v + a +3).

(2)

It follows that Defendant's incentive to forbear is socially optimal if and
only if d = v + a and the optimal damage level is v + a. As long as the
damage level fails to cover Plaintiff's loss and litigation cost, potential
defendants will fail to forbear in some instances in which forbearance
3. The simple model in this section is a version of that in Shavell (1982).

4. This framework applies in the torts setting to the case in which the potential defendant and the potential plaintiff can enter into a dispute resolution agreement before an
accident occurs. For example, many nuisance, trespass, and products liability cases fall in
this category. Obviously, traffic accidents, which typically involve strangers, do not fit

within this category.
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is socially desirable. Conversely, if the damage level exceeds the sum of
Plaintiff's loss and litigation cost, potential defendants will forbear in some
instances in which forbearance is not socially desirable. The former case
generates "underdeterrence" costs, the latter "overdeterrence" costs.
If potential plaintiffs were not allowed to bring claims, potential
defendants would not forbear. Thus, the net social benefit from the dispute
resolution forum is
(p - q)v - x - q( +3).

(3)

This is the difference between the deterrence benefit, in terms of avoided
losses net of avoidance costs, and the expected dispute resolution cost. If
this difference is negative, social welfare could be improved by prohibiting
litigation (Shavell 1982). To simplify, we will assume this difference is
positive.'
Consider the incentives for the parties to commit their disputes to
arbitration rather than remain in the litigation regime. The option to
commit to resolve disputes within an arbitral forum allows the parties
some choice over the expected damage award and the dispute resolution
costs. They will choose arbitration over the litigation regime whenever
switching to the arbitration regime enhances the net benefits from the
dispute resolution forum. Thus, the parties will choose to commit to
arbitration when the difference between the deterrence benefit and
expected dispute resolution cost is larger under arbitration than under the
litigation regime (Hylton 2000).
Examining (2) and (3), one can see several ways in which the difference between the deterrence benefit and dispute resolution cost can be
enhanced under an arbitration regime. Consider the following:
Underdeterrence in the Litigation Regime. Suppose that damages in the
litigation regime are less than the optimal level-that is, d< v + ca. In

this case, the level of forbearance among potential defendants is less
than the optimal level. Assuming that dispute resolution costs are the
same in the arbitration regime, the parties can minimize underdeterrence
costs by adopting an arbitration regime in which damages are set at the
optimal level (d = v + o). It follows that if d is so small in the litigation
regime that no victim has an incentive to sue, or if courts tend to err in
the direction of failing to award damages in the litigation regime, the
S. If this condition does not hold, then it may be desirable to reduce the optimal damage
level in order to discourage some lawsuits. See Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988); Hylton
(2002). The precise level of the optimal damage award is not important for this study.
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parties can gain jointly by committing to an arbitration regime in which
expected damages awards are closer to the optimal level.
Overdeterrence in the Litigation Regime. Suppose damages in the litigation
regime exceed the optimal level (d> v + ca). Since the level of forbearance
among potential defendants would exceed the optimal level, the parties
can enhance deterrence benefits by committing to an arbitration regime
in which the damage award is closer to the optimal level. Thus, if because
of the risk of a large punitive verdict, the expected damages award in
the litigation regime exceeds the optimal level, the parties have an
incentive to commit to an arbitration regime that caps damages at a
level closer to the optimal level. Similarly, if courts are likely to award
damages in inappropriate cases, the parties will have an incentive to
switch to arbitration.
Reducing Dispute Resolution Costs. It is clear from (3) that if dispute
resolution costs are lower in the arbitration regime and the deterrence
benefit is the same, the parties will prefer the arbitration regime. Of
course, in many instances there will be a connection between the two.
When high litigation costs effectively bar some victims from bringing
suit, committing to arbitration can simultaneously enhance the
deterrence benefit and reduce dispute resolution costs. In other cases,
the parties will trade off a reduction in the deterrence benefit for an even
greater reduction in the dispute resolution cost.6 The key factor in
determining the preference for arbitration is the difference between the
deterrence benefit and total dispute resolution cost. Thus, the parties
may prefer an arbitration regime in which dispute resolution costs are
substantially higher if the incremental deterrence benefit is large enough.
2.1.2. Low-Transaction-Costs Setting: Contract Terms as Substitutes and
Complements. So far, we have assumed that transaction costs prevent
the parties from contracting directly over the level of forbearance or
effort. This assumption should be relaxed in the contract setting.
Contracting parties often write rules into their agreements that directly
regulate the other party's conduct. Transaction costs obviously do not
prevent them from doing this.
There are other types of transaction costs, however, that might
discourage contracting parties from trying to write rules that directly
6. For example, parties may provide for less discovery in arbitration, potentially reducing the accuracy of the result, because the savings in dispute resolution costs exceed
the possible reduction in deterrence benefits. See Drahozal (2001).
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regulate ex ante incentives. In some settings, it is extremely costly for
the parties to specify the level of effort required, and there is a
correspondingly high probability that a court will misinterpret the
contract. These are cases in which the level of effort is "noncontractible."
In order to avoid errors in court that would result in suboptimal
deterrence, the parties may prefer to commit disputes involving these
matters to arbitration.
As a general rule, contractual explicitness-that is, setting out rules
that directly regulate ex ante incentives-should serve as a substitute to
arbitration. The reason is that explicit rules minimize the likelihood that
a court will err in a way that generates over- or underdeterrence costs.
In the case of a term that serves as a substitute, its presence implies that
the parties will have a lower demand for arbitration. However, some
explicit contract terms may serve as complements to arbitration. If a
term serves as a complement, its presence implies that the parties will
have a greater demand for arbitration. In particular, where the risk of
a court misinterpreting or failing to enforce a particular term is high
(for example, a cap on damages), the term is likely to serve as a
complement to an arbitration agreement.
Summing up, whether an explicit term serves as a substitute or
complement to arbitration depends on its relative accuracy of application
and its relative probability of enforcement in court. Contractual explicitness reduces any accuracy advantage that arbitration could provide,
making explicit terms a substitute to arbitration in most cases. The
exception to this rule is when the probability of enforcement in court
of a particular explicit term is low. In this case, the term may serve as
a complement to arbitration!
2.2. Arbitration in the Franchise Setting
2.2.1. Deterrence Issues in Arbitration. The foregoing can be applied to

franchising arrangements. Franchising is a form of business organization
'7. This framework may explain the conclusion of Lisa Bernstein's analysis of trade
association arbitrators; see Bernstein (1996). Bernstein found that even though those arbitrators had substantial expertise in the subject matter, they seemed to decide cases in a
formalist fashion based on explicit contract provisions and codified trade rules. They did
not seem to rely on their industry expertise to enforce implicit terms in the parties' contracts.
Although it is hard to say whether expertise plays an important role in any contract

interpretation setting, our framework could explain the reported conduct of Bernstein's
arbitrators as a response to low enforcement probabilities in the relevant courts. In any
event, there are other settings-notably, international commercial arbitration-in which
arbitrators are willing to enforce implicit as well as explicit contractual terms. See Drahozal
(2000).
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that economizes on monitoring costs in an enterprise with geographically
dispersed outlets.' The franchisor permits the franchisee to use its
trademark and business model and provides training and guidance in
running the business. In exchange, the franchisee pays the franchisor
ongoing royalties and is responsible for various upfront costs. A key
difference between company-owned outlets and franchised outlets is that
managers are paid a salary while franchisees receive a share of the profits
of the franchise. By making the franchisee a residual claimant, the franchisor reduces the need to monitor the franchisee, since the franchisee
bears much of the cost of his own shirking.
There is a fundamental incentive divergence under franchising that
results in the franchisee investing too little effort in maintenance of brand
capital. In the presence of a population of mobile consumers who
patronize other units in the franchise network, an individual franchisee
will not capture the full benefits from increasing his level of effort. The
benefits of such efforts are shared with the franchisor and with other
franchisees in the network. As a result, the franchisee will tend to exert
too little effort from the franchisor's perspective (Rubin 1978; Brickley
and Dark 1987; Brickley 1999). Moreover, the franchisee has an incentive to free ride on the brand's capital, since he captures the full savings
from reducing his effort level, while the devaluation of brand capital is
shared by other units in the network (Rubin 1978).
There are several factors that constrain the franchisee's incentive to
shirk or free ride. First, the franchisor will attempt to control the
franchisee's incentives through various structural and contractual incentive
alignment devices. One structural device is the ownership of a large
percentage of outlets in the network. Since company-owned outlets are
less likely to free ride, their presence in the network reduces the overall level of shirking. This enables the franchisor to allocate his monitoring
effort toward franchised units. It may also enhance franchisee incentives by
providing a form of "yardstick competition" with franchised outlets.9
Company-owned outlets serve as a benchmark for comparison to
franchised units.'"
Contractual incentive alignment devices are more common. Franchise
8. The economic analysis of franchise contracts starts with Rubin (1978). For some
of the theoretical literature building on Rubin, see Mathewson and Winter (1985);

Lafontaine and Raynaud (2002).
9. On the economics of yardstick competition generally, see Shleifer (1985).
10. For a discussion of the informational benefits of partial integration, see Michael

(2000).
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contracts include provisions that attempt to regulate the franchisee's effort
in service and brand promotion. For example, many franchise contracts
include restrictions on passive ownership, area development plans, and
mandatory advertising provisions.
Second, the franchisor will often monitor franchisees to ensure
compliance with explicit contractual terms and the franchisor's expectations. Franchise contracts often include provisions that authorize the
franchisor to monitor, such as the right to audit and to inspect the
franchisee periodically.
Third, repeat business to an individual unit serves as a constraining
factor. A high level of repeat business allows the franchisee to reap the
rewards of his efforts and also forces him to bear the costs of his shirking
(Brickley 1999). Thus, if the size of the franchise network is small, or the
units are far apart, each individual unit will enjoy a relatively large amount
of repeat business and will therefore have a greater concern for the longterm costs of shirking.
Fourth, sanctions for failing to comply with explicit and implicit
contractual

terms are employed. The most obvious sanctions are

termination and litigation. Termination is costly to the franchisee to the
extent that it causes him to lose a stream of "quasi rents." As Klein and
Saft (1985, p. 352) note, "[T]he franchisor may create quasi rents by
requiring the franchisee to invest in specific (not fully salvageable)
production assets on which the franchisee is earning a normal rate of
return but which, on termination, imply a capital cost penalty." The
creation of quasi rents in a franchise relationship is equivalent to having
the franchisee post a bond that he forfeits on termination. However, the
bond posted by the franchisee gives the franchisor an incentive to act
opportunistically-to appropriate the stream of quasi rents."'
Short of termination, suing for breach of contract is the likely sanction
imposed on a shirking franchisee. Parties may choose to resolve their
disputes in arbitration or through litigation. One important difference
between the two dispute resolution processes is their implications for
the continuity of the relationship. According to Williamson (1985,
11. On opportunism and franchise contracts, see Hadfield (1990) and Lafontaine and
Shaw (1999). Ordinarily, the franchisee relies on the franchisor's reputation as protection
against such opportunism. A franchisor that acts opportunistically toward its franchisees
will be less able to attract new franchisees in the future. However, as Klein (1980, p. 360)
explains, "[Tihis protective mechanism is limited by the relative importance of new franchise sales compared to the continuing franchise operation, that is, by the maturity of the
franchise chain."
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p. 71), "[W]hereas continuity (at least completion of the contract) is

presumed under arbitration machinery, that presumption is much weaker
when litigation is employed."
Ultimately, the credibility and force of sanctions depend on the
likelihood of their being upheld in a dispute resolution process. A
termination decision can be challenged, possibly leading to an expensive
judgment against the franchisor. Moreover, the sanctioning threat is an
important component of the franchising relationship in settings in which
the cost of monitoring is high and the level of repeat business to individual
units low. The parties will have a strong incentive in this setting to opt
for the dispute resolution forum in which the deterrence benefit is greatest.
2.2.2. The Choice between Arbitration and Litigation. Arbitration may be

preferable to the franchising parties when it enhances the deterrence or
governance benefit associated with contract enforcement. This may occur
because the expected damages award in court is above or below the
optimal level. In either case, a more accurate dispute resolution forum
would be preferable to the parties because it would provide damage
awards closer to the optimal level, which, in turn, reduces the costs from
overdeterrence or underdeterrence. In other words, although there is a
common view that high damage awards are good for franchisees and
bad for franchisors, this is not necessarily true. Since the costs of
overdeterrence are shared between the contracting parties, both are
potentially better off in the dispute resolution forum in which damage
awards are closest to the optimal level.
Arbitration offers the parties the opportunity to enter into a
specialized dispute resolution forum in which industry experts rather
than uninformed jurors evaluate the litigants' predispute conduct. Such
a forum can provide important benefits in cases involving difficult-tospecify or noncontractible requirements and expectations. 2 For example,
compliance with expectations that the franchisee devote optimal effort to
local promotion or customer service may be easier to evaluate accurately
or to enforce in the arbitration regime than in the litigation regime. To
the extent that the parties have greater confidence in the accuracy of the
dispute resolution forum, they can afford to leave contractual provisions
vague, saving contracting costs.
On the other hand, where contracts are clear and enforcement easy to
obtain through the courts, the parties are unlikely to find a greater
12. On contractual incompleteness and expectations, see Hadfield (1990, pp. 946-48).
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deterrence benefit under arbitration. Indeed, arbitration may reduce the
deterrence benefit if the parties are uncertain as to how the arbitral forum
will interpret contractual terms. This is especially likely when the courts
have already developed a body of gap-filling common-law rules that the
parties find acceptable. For example, a provision governing money due
under the contract is usually clear enough not to need the aid of industry
experts in determining if breach has occurred. Reliance on easily
enforceable, explicit contracts-backed up by a stable set of common-law
rules-may explain why banks continue to enforce their debt contracts
in ordinary courts rather than in arbitration forums, even though
arbitration could cut their litigation expenses substantially. 3
Consider an example: a dispute over the amount of effort a franchisee
gives to his business. Franchisors sometimes include provisions in the
franchise contract specifying the number of hours per week or the specific
times the franchisee must spend working at his franchised unit (Brickley
1999). These provisions are designed to increase the franchisee's effort
level by restricting his outside activities, thereby lowering the opportunity
cost to the franchisee of exerting effort at his unit (Brickley 1999). In the
absence of such a provision, it would be difficult to demonstrate to a
jury that the franchisee violated implicit contractual terms regarding his
level of effort. Even with such a provision, there are innumerable ways
in which a franchisee could comply with the hours requirement and yet
fail to exert an acceptable level of effort. For example, a franchisee required by contract to spend 40 hours per week at his unit could come in
at off-peak hours or pursue other personal projects while at the unit. Given
the difficulties in specifying and evaluating effort levels, an arbitration
forum could provide substantial deterrence benefits to the parties by
increasing the accuracy of contractual compliance assessments involving
the franchisee's level of effort.
In addition to providing a specialized tribunal, there is another way in
which arbitration may enhance accuracy in adjudication. Arbitrators have
different incentives than judges in resolving disputes. Arbitrators are
selected by the parties and are paid only when they hear a case. Judges,
by contrast, are assigned randomly to cases and paid fixed salaries by the
government. As a result, arbitrators compete for business and have an
13. Park (1998, pp. 215-16). We are aware of no solid empirical evidence proving

that arbitration always reduces litigation expenses. Our point is that it should be possible
for banks to design an arbitration regime for debt enforcement that is cheaper than the
courts.
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incentive to resolve disputes so as to enhance the governance benefits net
of dispute resolution costs to the contracting parties (Tullock 1980, pp.
127-33).
Finally, even if the arbitration forum provides no advantage in terms
of accuracy, the parties may still prefer it to litigation when it reduces
dispute resolution costs. Again, consider a provision that governs money
due under the contract. Since it is easy to determine whether a breach has
occurred, arbitration is unlikely to provide a greater degree of accuracy
than courts. In spite of this, parties may still prefer arbitration if the
reduction in dispute resolution costs is large.
We will use the expression "implicit terms" to refer to expectations
that are difficult to specify ex ante and to evaluate ex post, such as the
level of effort in service and advertising. Arbitration should provide
substantial deterrence benefits in evaluating compliance with implicit
terms. We will use the expression "explicit terms" to refer to expectations
that can be specified precisely in the contract, such as an agreement
regarding payment of money due, or an expectation based on the law,
such as the franchisor's expectation that the franchisee will not infringe
the trademark. Arbitration is unlikely to provide a deterrence benefit,
compared with the litigation regime, with respect to the explicit terms.
The parties are therefore likely to rely on litigation to enforce explicit
terms.
This discussion suggests both "external" and "internal" factors as
determinants of the probability of arbitration. The external factors are
institutional features over which the parties have no control and that can
be avoided by committing to arbitrate. For example, one external factor
is residence in a forum in which punitive damages awards are unusually
frequent. To the extent such factors generate excessive deterrence costs,
the parties have a joint incentive to reduce their costs by committing to
arbitration.
There are three internal factors that determine the probability of an
arbitration agreement. One is the ratio of implicit to explicit terms in the
franchise contract. As this ratio increases, the likelihood of arbitration
should also increase, since the deterrence benefit from arbitration should
be greater for implicit contractual terms. Second, the probability of a
dispute and the amount at stake should be associated with a greater
likelihood of arbitration, provided there are important implicit terms in
the contract. If arbitration provides a deterrence advantage, this benefit
will increase with the probability of a dispute as well as the amount at
stake, which implies that the probability of arbitration will increase. In
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the franchise setting, the probability of a dispute is determined by the
severity of the agency cost problem. In settings where the agency cost (or
incentive divergence) problem is more severe, the probability of a dispute
will be larger and so will the frequency of arbitration. The third
determinant of the probability of arbitration is the dispute resolution cost.
Arbitration is potentially cheaper than litigation. Thus, the parties have
an incentive to choose arbitration in order to lower dispute resolution
costs.
Since it is difficult to observe the ratio of implicit to explicit contract
terms, the probability of a dispute, and dispute resolution costs, we will
work with observable factors associated with these variables. Factors
associated with each of the three general determinants should be positively
related to the probability of arbitration. This has some specific
implications.
First, factors associated with a reduced probability of dispute or greater
reliance on contractual terms should be negatively related to the
probability of arbitration. Any feature that increases the bargaining power
of the franchisor relative to the franchisee should have this effect, since
the franchisor should find it easier to ensure compliance with contractual
terms as his bargaining power increases. The most important component
of the franchisor's bargaining power is his threat to terminate. Since the
likelihood of a dispute is relatively low in cases where the termination
threat is credible, the incremental benefit from switching to arbitration
should be correspondingly low. Thus, the probability of arbitration should
be negatively related to the factors that enhance the credibility of the
franchisor's termination threat.
Second, other contract terms play important roles as either substitutes
or complements to an arbitration agreement. The franchisor will prefer
to substitute toward explicit contractual terms if his termination threat is
credible only, or more credible, in the presence of explicit contractual
terms. Such substitution can occur by inserting more explicit governance
terms in the franchise agreement or by choosing a jurisdiction that is more
likely to enforce existing contractual terms. On the other hand, other
contract terms may serve as complements in the sense that they are more
likely to be enforced in an arbitral forum.
This framework may explain why certain disputes are explicitly
excluded from arbitration provisions. For example, trademark disputes
are often excluded from arbitration. The likely reason is that these disputes
do not involve implicit terms-that is, difficult-to-assess aspects such as
effort and quality. They involve matters of law that the courts have
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examined for many years and with respect to which have developed a
body of enforceable rules and effective remedies. For such issues, the
parties are unlikely to gain by removing them from the courts.

3.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

3.1. Sample

The sample consists of 75 franchises that have franchise agreements
available for public review at the Minnesota Department of Commerce.14
Minnesota, like a number of other states, requires franchisors to file
disclosure statements before selling franchises in the state.'" Generally,
the filing consists of a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) and
other materials, including a copy of the franchise agreement.16 The 75
franchises comprise most of the top-ranked franchises in Entrepreneur
Magazine's Franchise 500 for 1999.17 The Franchise 500 seeks to identify

"the best opportunities for entrepreneurs" on the basis of a variety of
objective factors."8 We do not use the ranking in any quantitative analysis. The sample, however, effectively includes only established franchisors that are seeking new franchisees, which limits our ability to test for
any relationship between franchisor opportunism and arbitration.
For each franchise in the sample, we collected a copy of the dispute
resolution clause from the publicly available copy of the franchise agreement. In the typical case, the copy of the franchise agreement on file in
Minnesota was the franchisor's standard form for all franchisees, with
state-specific addenda containing changes required by various state regulatory regimes. We collected the data from the standard forms without
regard to the provisions of the state-specific addenda. As a result, the

14. For a more detailed description of the sample, see Drahozal (2001).
15. Minnesota Statutes Annotated (West 1999, sec. 80C.02); see Federal Trade Commission (1999).
16. Minnesota Statutes Annotated (West 1999, sec. 80C.04(h)); Minnesota Rules
(1997, secs. 2860.3800, 2860.3500(15)).
17. Entrepreneur Magazine (1999a); see also Kobayashi and Ribstein (1999, p. 344)
(using Franchise 500 data to test the choice-of-law hypothesis).

18. Entrepreneur Magazine (1999b, 1999c) (ranking based on "objective quantifiable
measures of a franchise operation," including financial strength and stability, size of system,

years in business, length of time franchising, startup costs, litigation history, franchisee
terminations, and whether financing is provided).
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fact that Minnesota regulates certain terms of franchise agreements
should not significantly bias our results.19
Minnesota regulations require a separate filing whenever the franchisor offers a franchise with terms that "vary substantially" from the
terms on file, 2" which presumably discourages individually negotiated
changes in the franchise terms. Thus, we have some confidence that the
provisions we reviewed constituted the terms of franchises actually sold
in Minnesota. For each franchise, we coded variables to reflect the presence or absence of an arbitration clause, as well as whether the franchise
agreement sought to restrict punitive damages, imposed a time limit on
filing claims, or provided for litigation or arbitration to take place in
the state where the franchisor's home office was located.2
We classified each of the franchises in the sample as "high externality"
or "low externality" following Brickley (1999, pp. 754-57). Highexternality franchises are those in industries with a relatively low frequency of repeat business (to a specific franchise unit). Brickley includes
in this category auto and truck rentals and food service companies. Lowexternality franchises are those in industries with a relatively high frequency of repeat business. Brickley here includes auto product and service outlets, fitness centers, dry cleaners, lawn care companies, maid
services, travel agencies, and hair-styling outlets. To fill out this variable
for the franchises in our sample, we added motels and hotels to the highexternality category22 and video rental and other retail outlets, real estate

19. While the use of dispute resolution clauses taken from standard-form franchise
agreements avoids bias from collecting the data in Minnesota, it may overlook some franchisor responses to state regulations. To the extent that the franchisor responds to franchisee
protection statutes by use of state-specific addenda, those responses will not be reflected
in our data. An arbitration clause is not likely to be included (or excluded) in a statespecific addendum, however, because of the conspicuous disclosures concerning arbitration
0
required in the UFOC. See Drahozal (2001, pp. 722-23 and n.2 8). As a result, this is
not a serious limitation on our results.
20. Minnesota Rules (1997, sec. 2860.1100)
21. Clauses that gave the franchisor the option of requiring litigation in its home state
were treated the same as clauses that required the parties to litigate in the franchisor's
home state.
22. Brickley (1999, p. 755 n.20) notes that the hotel and motel industry is "commonly
considered 'nonrepeat.'" But he excludes such franchises from his sample because they are
unlikely to have restrictions on outside activities of franchisees, which was one of the types
of contract provisions he was studying. We face no similar constraint.
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brokerages, and providers of various business services to the lowexternality category. 3
Additional data about the franchises come from the Entrepreneur
Magazine Web site. For each of the franchises in the Franchise 500,24
the site reported the number of franchised and company-owned units
for the years 1996-98, the dates the franchisor began in business and
began franchising, whether the franchisor permits part-time or homebased operation of the franchise, and the initial investment required of
the franchisor.2" Although Entrepreneur Magazine considers the litigation history of franchisors in preparing the Franchise 500, it does not
publish or otherwise make available that information. Instead, we use
the urbanization rate of the state in which the franchisor's home office
is located as a proxy for the litigation risk faced by the franchisor (Posner
1997, p. 480). Finally, we rely on the list of states with franchisee protection statutes (those requiring cause for termination) compiled by Kobayashi and Ribstein (1999, p. 466 n.106).
3.2. Regression Variables and Hypotheses
3.2.1. Variables. The variables used in our probit regression analysis
are set out in Table 1. The dependent variable, Arb, is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one when the franchise agreement contains an
arbitration clause. The independent variables can be grouped into three
categories: contract terms, external, and internal. The "contract terms"
variables include Location, Timelimi, and Puni, each of which reflects a
23. Brickley (1999, p. 756) suggests that "the relation between the incentives to free
ride and repeat customers is less clear in companies that provide business-related services"
because of possible spillovers involving national clients. Nonetheless, the repeat nature of
the business (for example, management recruiting and commercial cleaning) should be such
that the incentive of the franchisee to free ride is less than in high-externality franchises
(that is, food service, vehicle rental, hotel, and motel franchises). Accordingly, we coded
business service and commercial cleaning as low externality. But see Brickley (1999,
p. 756), who argues that these industries were too ambiguous to classify.
24. The source of the data is UFOCs that franchisors provide to Entrepreneur
Magazine.

25. The initial investment of the franchisee comes from Item 7 of the UFOC, which
requires franchisors to disclose the amount of investment required in (a) "real property,
whether purchased or leased"; (b) "equipment, fixtures, [and] other fixed assets"; (c) "inventory required to begin operations"; (d) "security deposits, utility deposits, business
licenses, [and] other prepaid expenses"; (e) "additional funds required by the franchisee
before operations begin and during the initial phase of the franchise"; and (f) "other
payments that the franchisee must make to begin operations." North American Securities

Administrators Association (2000).
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TabLe 1. VariabLe Definitions
Variables
Dependent variable: Arb
Independent variables:
Hext (high externality)
Hexf
Stupcost (startup cost)
Co98perc (percent company
owned)
Homebase
Parttime
Frsin (franchising since date)
Inbs
Puni (punitive damages)
Timelimi (time limit)
Location
Frgr (franchise growth rate)
Hoflit (home office litigation)
Hofll
Frreg
Fr98

Definition
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchise agreement
contains arbitration clause
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchise is in a
"high-externality" industry
High externality x number of 1998 franchises
Initial investment in the franchise required of the
franchisee (median of range)
Number of company-owned outlets as a percentage of
total company-owned and franchised outlets in 1998
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchisor permits
the franchisee to operate franchise from home
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchisor permits
the franchisee to operate franchise on a part-time basis
The year the franchisor began franchising
The year the franchisor began doing business
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchise agreement
restricts award of punitive damages
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchise agreement
imposes a time limit for filing a claim
Dummy variable equaling one if the franchise agreement
provides for litigation/arbitration to take place in the
state where the franchisor's home office is located
Percentage change in the number of franchises between
1996 and 1998
Urbanization rate in the state where the franchisor's
home office is located
Hoflit x Location
Dummy variable equaling one if the state in which the
franchisor's home office is located has enacted a
franchisee protection statute
Number of franchisees in 1998

term in the dispute resolution clause of the franchise contract. The
"external variables" category consists of variables that measure external
features over which the parties have no control, such as the litigiousness
of the home office jurisdiction (Hoflit). In addition to Hoflit, the other
external variables are Frreg and the interaction term Hofll. The
"internal" category includes variables that describe descriptive features
of the franchise relationship, such as the percentage of company-owned
units (Co98perc). In addition to Co98perc, the other internal variables
are Fr98, Frsin, Inbs, Stupcost, Homebase, Parttime, Frgr, Hext, and the
interaction term Hexf.
Perhaps the only one of the independent variables that needs
explanation is Frreg, the dummy variable coding for the existence of a
franchisee protection statute in the state of the franchisor's home office.2 6
26. Instead of a dummy variable, it might be preferable to use as a variable the percentage of franchised units located in states with franchisee protection statutes. The data
set we are using did not include such a variable, however.
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Purportedly to protect franchisees from opportunism, a number of states
have enacted statutes to restrict the ability of franchisors to terminate
franchisees. The statutes variously forbid termination other than for
"cause" or permit the franchisee an opportunity to cure (Brickley, Dark,
and Weisbach 1991).
The franchisee protection statutes differ, however, in scope of
application. Some unambiguously apply only to in-state franchisees.
Others by their terms apply to both in-state and out-of-state franchisees,
although some courts have construed them more narrowly.27 To consider
the effects of these differences, we split the Frreg variable into two new
variables, FrregA and FrregB. The variable FrregA equals one when the
franchisor is located in a state with a franchisee protection statute
applicable only to in-state franchisees. The variable FrregB equals one
when the franchisor is located in a state with a franchisee protection
statute applicable to both in-state and out-of-state franchisees.
The average start date for businesses in the sample is 1964. The
average date they began franchising is 1975. The sample businesses had
2,331 franchise outlets and 401 company-owned outlets in 1998. The
dummy variables describing the franchise contracts indicate that 34 firms
had arbitration clauses, 55 had location clauses, 25 had time limit
clauses, and 40 had punitive damages clauses. The numbers of homebased and part-time arrangements were 10 and 12, respectively.
3.2.2. The Endogeneity Problem.

We are using contract term variables

in the regression equation for Arb in order to search for evidence that
particular terms are either substitutes or complements to arbitration.
However, one problem with using contract variables in a regression
model in which Arb, another contract term, is the dependent variable
is that the contract terms may be endogenous because they are jointly
determined along with Arb. For example, most observers would assume
that the decision to include an arbitration agreement (Arb) and the
decision to include a clause limiting damages (Puni) would be influenced
27. The three states in which these types of statute appear are Michigan, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin. However, in Minnesota and Wisconsin, federal district courts have held
that the statutes apply only to in-state franchisees. The Minnesota case was decided after
these data were collected. The Wisconsin case was decided before these data were collected.
On this interpretation of the statutes, subdividing the Frreg variable is unnecessary. How-

ever, we subdivided Frreg on the theory that a franchisor in Michigan, Minnesota, or
Wisconsin would be advised by counsel of the risk that a state or federal appellate court
might hold that the state's franchisee protection statute applies to both in-state and out-

of-state franchisees and that this advice would affect the terms of the franchise agreement.
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by some of the same factors, though in different ways. If one were to
simply include Puni in a regression equation in which Arb is the
dependent variable, the error term would be correlated with Puni.
One approach to this would be to treat the contract term variables
as if they are all endogenous and set up a four-equation "seemingly
unrelated regressions" model using Arb, Puni, Location, and Timelimi
as dependent variables and the internal and external variables as
independent variables. However, this approach would not allow us to
examine evidence of substitution between the arbitration clause and
explicit contract terms. An alternative approach is to find instrumental
variables for all of the contract term variables in the regression model.
This is unworkable because our sample could not possibly yield a
sufficient number of variables that could serve as instruments.
Our solution to this problem was to try to determine which contract
variables seemed to be endogenous and to instrument for this subset.
To do this, we ran a series of pairwise bivariate probit regressions using
the four contract term variables as dependent variables and the other
variables as independent variables. We examined the results for significant correlations across error terms. The only statistically significant
correlation was that between the Arb and Puni regression equations.28 On
the basis of this result, we decided to use a single-equation model, with
Arb as the dependent variable and using instruments for Puni. We treated
the other contract term variables (Timelimi and Location) as exogenous,
given the results of the bivariate probit regressions:

Arb,

=

i=oifotherwise,
Xig + cePunii + ei> 0,

Punii

=

1
10

8
if W b+vi>O0,
otherwise,

cov(s,, v;) # 0,

where the vector Xi includes the exogenous variables of the Arb regression model and W consists of the exogenous instruments for Puni. We
28. The maximum-likelihood method we used did not estimate the error correlation
directly. If p represents the error correlation, we estimated atanhp = ' In [(1 + p)/(1 - p)].
For the Arb and Puni equations, atanhp = 12.17 (t-statistic = .03), and the hypothesis
p = 0 was rejected at the 1-percent significance level. For the Arb and Location pairing,
atanhp = .17 (t-statistic = .71), and the hypothesis p = 0 was not rejected (at the 1-, 5-,

or 10-percent levels). For the Arb and Timelimi pairing, atanhp = .23 (t-statistic = 1.04),
and the hypothesis p = 0 was not rejected (at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent levels).
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estimated the model by the maximum-likelihood method for the standard
bivariate probit model.
3.2.3. Expected Signs of Regression Coefficients. To simplify our dis-

cussion of hypotheses, we will divide the independent variables used for
the Arb regression into the three categories identified earlier: contract
terms, internal, and external.
Contract Term VariabLes. We expect Timelimi, which codes for the
existence of a clause limiting the time in which a claim may be filed, to
have a negative coefficient. The reason is that if the parties have already
agreed to a provision constraining litigation, the litigation cost or
deterrence concerns that might lead them to prefer arbitration are
lessened to some extent. In addition, since time limit agreements are
common and pose no special enforcement problems in courts, the parties
expect them to be enforced like any other explicit contractual term. Thus,
the parties should be less likely to choose arbitration if they have agreed
to time limits.
For the same reason, we expect a negative coefficient on Location,
which codes for the existence of a clause selecting the franchisor's home
state forum for litigation. If the parties have shown a preference for the
home forum, particularly one in which juries are less likely to have a
"deep pocket" view of franchisors, they should be less likely to opt for
arbitration.
Both Timelimi and Location reflect the parties' interests in enhancing
deterrence benefits and controlling dispute resolution costs. Time limits
and venue specifications both reduce the likelihood of overdeterrence,
and in this sense enhance the deterrence benefit associated with contract
enforcement. Both also reduce dispute resolution costs. Dispute costs
are obviously reduced by the imposition of time limits, since they cut
off claims arising after the limit. Venue specification also reduces
litigation costs by saving the franchisor the cost of having to litigate in
many different jurisdictions and of having to bring the same set of
witnesses to various states for trial. In addition, franchisees are less likely
to sue in a forum that is less generous to plaintiffs.
We expect the coefficient on Puni to be positive. The existence of a
clause limiting damages shows a big concern on the franchisor's part
that a punitive damage award is a likely event in court. If the expected
level of such an award exceeds the optimal damage level, the parties
will have a joint incentive to agree to contractual limits on damages.
Given this incentive, the parties will also have a joint incentive to choose
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the arbitration regime, since the deterrence benefit will be greater in the
arbitration regime.
One might argue that our assumptions regarding Puni, on one hand,
and Timilimi and Location, on the other, seem inconsistent. With the
former set of variables, we argue that arbitration is more likely. With
the latter variable, we argue that arbitration is less likely. What explains
the difference? Both sets of variables reflect overdeterrence concerns.
However, we think the Puni restrictions are more likely to serve as
complements rather than substitutes to arbitration. This is because of
the greater risk that contractual restrictions on punitive claims may not
be enforced in court, and the greater potential loss to the franchisor in
the event a court chooses not to enforce such restrictions.2 9 Given these
risks, franchisors will seek arbitration in order to enhance the likelihood
that restrictions on punitive damages claims will be enforced (Kobayashi
and Ribstein 1999).
Interna[ VariabLes. The term Co98perc should have a negative coefficient,
because as the percentage of company-owned units increases in the
network, the incentive divergence problem lessens. In part, this statement
is tautological: the incentive divergence problem associated with
franchising necessarily lessens as the degree of partial integration
increases. However, to the extent that partial integration improves the
monitoring capability of the franchisor, the shirking and free-riding
problem should lessen even within the franchised units of a partially
integrated network (Michael 2000, p. 2). Steven Michael argues that
partial integration provides an additional bargaining power advantage
to the franchisor, since the partially integrated franchisor has a more

29. We would lose little in remaining uncommitted about the signs of the coefficients
on Puni, Timelimi, and Location and merely saying that we expect them to have a big
impact. If we took this approach, we would allow the regression results to tell us whether
the restriction served as a complement or substitute to arbitration. In any event, there is
evidence supporting our argument that some state court judges would be reluctant to
enforce punitive damage restrictions. A study of judicial decisions in Alabama finds that
judges' votes on arbitration decisions are strongly correlated with the source of campaign
funding (plaintiffs' lawyers or business); see Ware (1999). See also Ex ParteThicklin (824
So. 2d 723, 733 [Ala. 2002]) ("it violates public policy for a party to contract away its
liability for punitive damages, regardless of whether the provision doing so was intended
to operate in an arbitral or judicial forum").
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credible threat to terminate the franchisee and replace it with an
integrated unit.3"
The coefficient on Parttime should be positive, since the problem of
ensuring adequate effort is exacerbated in the case in which the
franchisee works part-time. Given the greater likelihood of a dispute
over effort levels, Parttime should be positively related to the probability
of a dispute. Moreover, since the level of effort is difficult to specify and
enforce contractually, the disputes associated with part-time status
should be drawn heavily from those in which arbitration offers superior
governance benefits relative to litigation. For the same reason, we expect
Homebase to have a positive coefficient.
The coefficient on Stupcost, measuring startup costs, should be
negative. If the startup cost variable is positively related to the
franchisee's unrecoverable entry costs, a plausible assumption, then an
increase in Stupcost implies a more credible termination threat on the
part of the franchisor (Klein 1980; Klein and Saft 1985). Armed with a
more credible sanction against shirking on effort, the franchisor will
have greater confidence that the franchisee will comply with explicit and
implicit contractual terms.
There is an alternative theory that also suggests that the coefficient
on Stupcost should be negative. As the cost of entry increases, one
expects both parties to rely more on explicit contractual terms. The
franchisor would prefer to avoid the risk that it will be seen as
terminating unfairly. The franchisee will prefer the security of knowing
precisely what is required. Since both parties should prefer greater
contractual explicitness as the startup cost gets larger, their demand for
arbitration should fall, since they will write explicit contracts that can
be entrusted to courts for enforcement.
The term Frgr, which measures growth of the franchise network
between 1996 and 1998, does not have a clear sign under our theory.
On one hand, network growth suggests increasing litigation expenses,
which should push the parties toward the arbitration regime. On the
other hand, a franchise that is growing fast may prefer to rely on explicit
contracts, for several reasons. First, the fast-growing network may not
have established reputation, in which case contractual explicitness will
30. Michael (2000). Michael's paper is concerned with "tapered integration," which
occurs when the franchisor itself supplies some portion of the franchisee's inputs and some
portion of the output is sold to the franchisor. However, his paper includes a thorough
discussion of the effects of partial integration.
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substitute for reputation. Second, the fast-growing network, even if well
established, may wish to use explicitness as a form of tying its hands,
to assure the franchisee that the risk of arbitrary termination or
expropriation is small. These arguments suggest that Frgr may have
either a positive or negative coefficient, depending on whether the
litigation cost factor outweighs the governance factor.
The variable Frsin, which measures the date at which the business
began franchising, does not have an obvious coefficient sign under the
theory of this paper. The same goes for Inbs, which measures the date
at which the business began. On one hand, one might expect it to be
negative, on the theory that a firm that enters the business late will have
to rely on explicit contractual terms to substitute for reputation, and
contractual explicitness implies a lower demand for arbitration. On the
other hand, if the likelihood of a dispute is high, a newcomer may have
a strong demand for arbitration, both for its deterrence benefits and to
reduce dispute costs.
As one should expect, Frsin and Inbs are strongly correlated, with a
coefficient of .48. Because of this, we decided not to use both in the
regression equation for Arb. We settled on using Inbs in the regression
equation for Arb, and Frsin as an instrument for Puni.
The term Hext appears by itself and interacted with Fr98 (recall that
Hexf = Fr98 x Hext). This makes interpretation of the Hext coefficient
complicated. The Hext variable is equal to one when repeat business is
low (and thus externalities are high). High-externality industries should
be associated, other things being equal, with a greater likelihood of
dispute. The interaction term Hexf can be understood as providing a
volume-like measure of the externality problem. Alternatively, it can be
understood as the product of the probability of a dispute and the cost
of dispute resolution, since dispute costs will increase as the network
size increases. This alternative view implies that Hexf is a proxy for the
expected cost of dispute resolution.
We expect both Hext and Hexf to have positive coefficients. However,
Hexf should have a much stronger effect, because it is a closer proxy
of the expected cost of disputes. There are two reasons. First, the
expected total cost of litigation increases as the franchise network
expands, which suggests that arbitration is more likely as a means of
reducing dispute resolution costs. Second, since the agency cost problem
increases (other things being equal) with the size of the network, Fr98
should itself be positively related to the likelihood of a dispute for those
franchises that get relatively little repeat business.
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What about the sign of Fr98? Again, this is complicated because it
appears by itself and interacted with Hext in the regression. Examining
the Fr98 variable coefficient alone, we expect it to capture the effect of
expanding the number of networks in the low-externality setting. In this
case the effects are unclear. On the one hand, arbitration remains useful
as a means of cutting dispute resolution costs. On the other hand, as
the network expands, the parties should have a greater demand for
formality in contracts. Since monitoring is difficult, the franchisor wants
to avoid a reputation for punishing arbitrarily, hence the need for explicit
contracts. The franchisee should also prefer explicit contracts, given the
lack of frequent contact with the franchisor's home office. 3 Thus, in the
low-externality case, we hypothesize that both litigation cost and
deterrence motivations will be at work. The litigation cost factors push
toward arbitration. The deterrence factors may push away from
arbitration, since explicitness will lead the parties to keep their disputes
in the courts. As a result, the expected sign of Fr98 is unclear.
External Variables. The sign on Frreg, the dummy variable coding for
the existence of a franchisee protection statute, is unclear under the
theory of this paper. Recall that protection statutes restrict the
franchisor's power to terminate, often requiring proof of a good reason
(that is, "cause"). Thus, a protection statute reduces the franchisor's
bargaining power by weakening the credibility of its threat to terminate
the franchise. The effects, however, are complicated because the
franchisor should be able to maintain a credible threat to sanction
(including termination) for the violation of an explicit provision of the
franchise agreement. Hence, if franchisors generally respond to
franchisee protection statutes by adopting more explicit terms in their
contracts or by reducing the number of franchised units (Brickley, Dark,
and Weisbach 1991), the protection statutes may be associated with a
lower demand for arbitration. This implies a negative coefficient for
Frreg. On the other hand, if franchisors expect favorable treatment under
arbitration, in the sense that arbitrators are more likely to disregard
franchisee protection statutes or to enforce their contract provisions,
31. This is consistent with the literature on information constraints and organizational

form-see, for example, Stein and Masten (2000). Explicit contract terms "harden" information, allowing it to be transmitted with accuracy along a large hierarchical network.
This theory suggests that one by-product of information hardening is a reduction in the

demand for arbitration.
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protection statutes should increase their demand for arbitration. This
implies a positive coefficient on Frreg.
Put another way, the franchisor's response to a protection statute will
be to substitute toward the dispute resolution regime in which its threat
to sanction is most credible. If the franchisee protection statute is
interpreted in the same manner by arbitrators and judges, the franchisor
should substitute toward structural and contractual incentive alignment
devices-company-owned outlets and explicit contract terms. However,
if arbitrators are more likely to enforce contract terms or to interpret
franchisee protection statutes in a manner favorable to franchisors, the
franchisor will prefer the arbitration forum.
The variable Hoflit, which proxies for the litigiousness of the
franchisor's home office state, appears twice in the regression, once alone
and the other time interacted with Location (recall that Hofll = Hoflit
x Location). When Hoflit appears interacted with Location, the
interacted variable measures the effect of litigiousness in the home office
state when the parties have chosen to litigate in the home office state.
When Hoflit appears alone, it measures the effect of home office state
litigiousness when the parties have chosen not to litigate in the home
office forum.
The coefficient on Hoflit should be negative. To see this, consider the
case of parties that have chosen to avoid the home office state by
resolving their disputes in another forum. Their potential savings from
changing the venue are greater as the litigiousness of the home office
state (which they have escaped) increases. Given this, they should have
a lower demand for arbitration.
The coefficient on Hofll should be positive. To see this, consider the
case of parties that have decided to allow litigation to occur in the home
office state. The coefficient on the interaction variable Hofll should be
positive, since these parties are more likely to choose arbitration if they
have decided to allow litigation to occur in a litigious forum.
3.2.4. Choice of Instruments. The instrument panel for the Puni regression equation consists of external and internal variables that we thought
would serve well as predictors of a punitive damages clause. For the
internal variables, we used a 2-year lagged measure of the franchise size:
Fr96 and Frsin. The variable Frsin seems intuitively to be a better
instrument for the Puni regression than Inbs, because Frsin measures how
long the franchisor has been involved in franchising. One would expect
the franchisor's demand for a punitive damages clause to fall as the number
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of years it has been franchising increases, since trust and reputation
constraints should gradually replace reliance on explicit terms, and this
was confirmed. 3"
On the assumption that the litigiousness of the home office jurisdiction
would affect the likelihood of a punitive damages clause, we created two
new external variables as instruments for the Puni regression. One, Eljc,
is a dummy variable equaling one if the judges in the home office state
are elected. The other, Efh, is an interaction term equal to the product of
Eljc, Frreg, and Hoflit. To be sure, Eljc is not a direct measure of
litigiousness. However, if elected judges tend to vote in favor of the groups
that fund their campaigns (Ware 1999), franchisors should prefer explicit
caps on damages in order to protect themselves from pro-plaintiff judges.
3.3. Results
The probit regression results are shown in Table 2. For a sample with
only 75 observations, the results are surprisingly strong, with 10 of the
coefficients in Table 2 coming in statistically significant at the 5-percent
level. Of the statistically significant variables, all have the predicted signs,
and most of the signs for the insignificant coefficient estimates accord
with our predictions.
3.3.1. Deterrence Hypothesis. The results suggest that the deterrence
concerns are an important determinant of the decision to commit
disputes to arbitration and that deterrence factors have a greater impact
than litigation cost factors. These claims are supported by several of the
coefficient estimates in Table 2. First, note that one of the largest of the
sharply estimated coefficients, Puni, has the sign predicted by the
deterrence theory. To the extent the parties are concerned about the
prospect of punitive awards in their jurisdiction, and to the extent these
awards are perceived as generating overdeterrence costs, the parties are
considerably more likely to opt for a predispute arbitration agreement.
Second, compare the coefficients on Location and Timelimi. Both
variables measure efforts by the parties to control the amount and type
of litigation in order to reduce overdeterrence costs. Both coefficients
have the predicted signs, which indicates that an arbitration agreement
is less likely when the parties have made efforts to control litigation.
Note also the positive coefficient estimate for Hofll (interacting Hoflit
32. We do not report the results of the Puni regression below. The coefficient on Frsin
in that regression was positive, showing that the shorter the relationship, the more likely
a punitive clause (coefficient = .016, t-statistic = 1.79).
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Table 2. Probit Regression ResuLts
Variable
Contract terms:
Location*
Timelimi*
Puni*
External variables:
Frreg*
Hoflit*
HoflI'
Internal variables:
Inbs
Fr98*
Co98perc*
Stupcost*
Homebase
Parttime'
Frgr*
Hext
Hexf*
Constant

Coefficient

Marginal
Effect

Coefficient
SE

t-Statistic

Significance
Level

-6.268
-. 739
3.511

-. 978
-. 258
.887

2.933
.412
.658

-2.14
-1.79
5.33

.033
.073
.000

-1.354
-. 076
.082

-. 453
-. 028
.031

.531
.031
.039

-2.55
-2.41
2.11

.011
.016
.035

.009
.0003
.280
.0004
.642
.918
.093
.485
.0002
18.565

-. 26
-1.94
-3.53
-2.55
.22
1.90
-3.29
-1.50
2.23
.56

.799
.052
.000
.011
.823
.058
.001
.134
.026
.577

-.
-.
-.
-.

002
0005
989
001
.143
1.743
-. 308
-. 726
.0006
10.358

-.
-.
-.
-.

001
0002
371
0004
.055
.603
-. 115
-. 268
.0002

Note. Bivariate Probit using Arb as dependent variable. Instrument panel for Puni: Eljc,

Fr96, Frsin, Efh. Marginal effects for Frreg, Location, Timelimi, Parttime, Hext, and Homebase are based on a discrete change of the dummy variable from zero to one. Number of
observations = 75; log likelihood = -75.956.

SE = standard error.

+ Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.

and Location), which indicates that the parties are more likely to choose
arbitration if they have already chosen to resolve their disputes in a

litigious home office state.
Location should be relatively more sensitive to deterrence concerns
than Timelimi, since the location choice will often be used to avoid
litigious jurisdictions. The fact that the Location coefficient is larger than

that for Timelimi can be viewed, under this hypothesis, as further support
for the claim that deterrence concerns appear to dominate litigation cost
concerns in the decision to opt for a predispute arbitration agreement.
Third, and most striking, the coefficient estimates on Co98perc and

Stupcost are both negative and significant, as predicted. The Co98perc
estimate indicates that as the percentage of company-owned units
increases the demand for arbitration falls. This is consistent with the
view that as Co98perc increases, the fundamental incentive divergence
problem in franchising becomes less severe. As this happens, the

deterrence benefits from arbitration fall, and arbitration becomes less
attractive. The Stupcost estimate indicates that as the franchisee's setup
cost increases, the demand for arbitration falls. This is consistent with
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the view that the incentive divergence problem lessens as the franchisor's
bargaining power increases.
The positive coefficient on Parttime is consistent with the prediction
that arbitration is more likely when it is hard to specify and enforce
implicit contractual terms, as is the case with franchisee effort. Since it
is difficult to monitor the effort of franchisees that work part-time or
at home, the franchisor must rely on legal sanctions in order to encourage
a high level of effort. Since arbitration offers the advantage of review
by an expert panel (alternatively, a panel with superior incentives for
accuracy), enforcement is more predictable, enhancing deterrence. That
the coefficient for Parttime is significant, while that for Homebase is
not, suggests that the monitoring issue is especially important for parttime franchisees.
The network size coefficient estimates suggest complicated effects.
The negative coefficient on Fr98 indicates that the parties are less likely
to choose arbitration as the size of the network increases. However, the
coefficient on Hexf, interacting Hext and Fr98, is positive. The two
results in combination suggest that for low-externality (equivalently,
high-repeat-customer) businesses, franchise scale is negatively associated
with the likelihood of arbitration. For high-externality businesses,
franchise scale is positively associated with arbitration. The latter result
is intuitive: disputes are more likely in high-externality businesses, thus
arbitration should be preferred as a means of both reducing litigation
expenses and enhancing deterrence. The negative coefficient on Fr98
suggests that in low-externality settings, the parties are more likely to
rely on explicit contract terms, easily enforceable in court, to govern the
relationship as the network expands. This reduces their demand for
arbitration.
The results for network size also lend support to the notion that
deterrence enhancement rather than the litigation cost reduction is the
dominant motivation behind arbitration. If litigation cost reduction were
the major motivation behind arbitration, one should expect to see a
positive relationship between network size and arbitration, even in the
case of low-externality businesses. However, the negative coefficient
suggests that the litigation cost savings are not sufficient to entice the
parties to forgo the deterrence benefits secured by the option to litigate
in ordinary courts. After all, ordinary courts have an established set of
legal precedents on which the parties can rely and use to predict the
outcomes of potential disputes. These results suggest that the litigation
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cost savings must be quite large for the parties to choose to forgo these
advantages.
3.3.2. Contractual Substitutes and Complements to Arbitration. The
variable Frreg has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The
estimated marginal effect suggests that if you compare similar
franchisors, one based in a state with a franchisee protection statute and
the other not, the probability of an arbitration agreement is lower by
.45 for the franchisor based in the state with the protection statute.
At a minimum, this result suggests that franchisors have not viewed
arbitration as a forum in which arbitrators would disregard or misapply
franchise protection statutes to benefit franchisors. All else equal,
franchisors located in states with no franchise protection statute are more
likely to provide for arbitration than other franchisors. The result
suggests that franchisors have responded to franchisee protection
statutes by reducing franchised units and substituting toward explicit
contractual terms, both reducing the demand for arbitration. To the
extent the negative coefficient reflects structural responses (reductions
in the number of units, home office location choices), it is consistent
with the results of Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach's study of franchise
termination statutes.33 However, since we have controlled for the key
structural response, the percentage of company-owned units
(Co98perc),34 we view the negative coefficient on Frreg as reflecting
substitution toward explicit terms that are likely to be enforced in court.
Table 3 presents the results after splitting the Frreg variable into
FrregA (for statutes limited solely to in-state franchisees) and FrregB (for
statutes applicable by their terms to both in-state and out-of-state
franchisees). The negative relationship appears to be stronger for FrregA

33. Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach (1991) find evidence that franchisee protection statutes cause a small reduction in the number of franchised units in settings where repeat

business is low.
34. In light of the weak structural response found in Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach
(1991), one might think that a superior approach to estimating the Co98perc coefficient
(and Frreg) would be to separate its effect in states that have franchisee protection laws

and those that do not. In order to this, we ran a version of the regression in Table 2
interacting Co98perc and Frreg. The interaction term came in insignificant, and the new

estimates for Co98perc and Frreg, though slightly smaller in absolute value, were close to
the estimates reported in Table 2.
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Table 3. Probit Regression Results after Splitting Frreg into FrregA and FrregB
Variable
Contract terms:
Location'
Timelimi
Puni*
External variables:
FrregA
FrregB
Hoflit*
Hofll +
Internal variables:
Inbs
Fr98*
Co98perc*
Stupcost*
Homebase
Parttime*
Frgr*
Hext
Hexf*
Constant

Coefficient

Marginal
Effect

Coefficient
SE

t-Statistic

Significance
Level

-5.643
-. 664
3.585

-. 974
-. 225
.882

3.133
.437
.686

-1.80
-1.52
5.22

.072
.129
.000

-1.953
-. 955
-. 064
.072

-. 484
-. 280
-. 023
.026

.690
.614
.036
.042

-2.83
-1.56
-1.78
1.72

.005
.120
.076
.085

-. 002
-. 0006
-1.070
-. 001
.182
1.627
-. 307
-. 812
.0007
8.913

-.
-.
-.
-.

-. 19
-2.11
-3.59
-2.61
.29
2.46
-3.80
-1.59
2.40
.43

.848
.035
.000
.009
.768
.014
.000
.112
.016
.665

0007
0002
387
0004
.068
.581
-. 111
-. 289
.0002

.010
.0003
.297
.0005
.620
.660
.081
.511
.0003
20.585

Note. Bivariate probit using Arb as dependent variable. Instrument panel for Puni: Eljc,
Fr96, Frsin, Efh. Marginal effect for FrregB is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Marginal effect for Hext is significant at the 10% level. Number of observations = 75;
log likelihood = -74.727. SE = standard error.
*Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.

than for FrregB, although testing for the equality of coefficients fails to
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal.3 5
35. Although the difference between the FrregA and FrregB coefficients is not statistically significant, the larger coefficient estimate for FrregA seems to confound the main
result. What might explain the larger coefficient for FrregA? We can offer three possible
explanations (keeping in mind that the difference is not statistically significant). First, the
result could be due to a "composition effect," which would hold if most firms in the sample
have most of their franchise outlets within the home state of the franchisor or close to it.
In the Midwest, for example, a large percentage of the states have franchisee protection
statutes (Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri). Any franchise operating in
the Midwest would most likely find itself constrained by franchise regulation statutes in
its home state and in nearby states. Second, there could be a "penalty effect" that results
from a perception that an arbitration clause might lead to heavier scrutiny by home-state
regulators. Thus, franchisors that reside in regulated states would be the most reluctant to
demand an arbitration clause. Third, the negative coefficient may reflect substitution choices
by contracting parties based in states that do not have franchisee protection statutes. If
those parties prefer arbitration in order to minimize the likelihood of falling under the
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Table 4. Elasticities
Variable
Fr98
Stupcost
Co98perc
Hoflit
Frgr
Hofil
Hexf

Elasticity
-1.22
-. 33
-. 31
-5.90
-. 16
4.60
.77

3.3.3. Comparing Deterrence Effects. In order to make a better comparative assessment of the coefficient estimates, we converted those for
the continuous variables into elasticities. The results are presented in
Table 4 (based on estimates in Table 2). The largest elasticity, -5.9, is
that for Hoflit, the proxy for litigiousness in the home office jurisdiction.
Recall that we use the state urbanization rate as the proxy for
litigiousness. The estimate indicates that a 1-percent increase in the
urbanization rate of the home office state reduces the demand for
arbitration among those who have not opted to litigate inside the home
jurisdiction by almost 6 percent. This large elasticity makes sense if we
read this as indicating the extent to which parties are using venue
specification to opt out of high-litigation jurisdictions. After opting out
of such jurisdictions, the parties apparently see little need to precommit
to arbitration.
The large elasticity on Hoflit provides yet another piece of support
for the claim that the deterrence theory provides the strongest account
of the motivation for arbitration. We have argued that contracting
parties opt out of high-litigation jurisdictions in order to reduce
overdeterrence costs. They have a joint incentive to do so, since
overdeterrence costs are shared between them. After opting out of a
high-litigation forum, the key remaining motivation for choosing
arbitration over litigation is the desire to reduce dispute resolution costs.
However, the large negative elasticity on Hoflit, which implies that the
parties do not have a strong demand for arbitration once they have
escaped a high-litigation forum, suggests that the motivation to reduce
dispute costs is not strong. Conversely, the large positive elasticity on
Hofll suggests that among those parties that have not opted out of the
franchisee protection statute of another state, we could observe the result in Table 2.
However, we find this explanation less likely, since the parties could include more cheaply
a choice-of-law clause to the same effect. If, however, arbitrators are more likely to enforce
such choice-of-law clauses than courts, the results here could nonetheless follow.
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home office forum, a 1-percent increase in litigiousness leads to a nearly
5-percent increase in their demand for arbitration.
The other elasticity estimates are dwarfed by the location measures,
but they still reveal interesting information. A 1-percent increase in
network size reduces the demand for arbitration by 1.2 percent in the
low-externality setting and increases the demand for arbitration by
roughly .8 percent in the high-externality setting. Two variables that the
franchisor controls, the percentage of company-owned units and the
franchisee's startup cost, have different impacts on the probability of
arbitration. A 1-percent increase in the startup cost reduces the
probability of arbitration by .33 percent, while a 1-percent increase in
the percentage of company-owned units reduces the probability by .3
percent. This suggests that when choosing between the two instruments,
the franchisor should have an incentive to increase the startup cost in
order to control franchisee incentives.
3.4. Overview of Results
The central claim of this paper is that contracting parties will choose
the dispute resolution forum that maximizes the deterrence or governance benefits associated with their contract net of dispute resolution
costs. The deterrence benefit from contract enforcement is the sum of
harms avoided net of avoidance costs. Since arbitration clearly has the
potential to reduce dispute resolution costs, the key contribution of this
study is its demonstration of the relative importance of deterrence factors
in the arbitration decision.
Holding dispute resolution costs fixed, parties will structure their
contract so that future disputes are resolved within the forum that provides the optimal level of deterrence against undesirable conduct. Thus,
if expected damages in court exceed or fall below the optimal level, and
expected damages under arbitration are closer to the optimal level, they
will have an incentive to commit to arbitration. For disputes involving
implicit contractual terms the parties will prefer arbitration, provided
the arbitration forum is the more accurate one for dispute resolution.
As the probability of a dispute increases, their preference for committing
disputes over implicit terms to arbitration should increase.
The results of this paper support these implications of the deterrence
hypothesis. Franchising parties who include provisions in their contracts
limiting damages-those most concerned about the risk of excessive
damages in court-are highly likely to opt for arbitration. Among the
parties who have chosen to opt out of a litigious jurisdiction by specifying
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an alternative venue, a 1-percent increase in the litigiousness (measured
by urbanization rate) of the home office jurisdiction reduces the probability of arbitration by 6 percent. Factors suggesting a potentially
greater reliance on explicit contractual terms, such as the existence of
a franchisee protection statute, substantially reduce the probability of
an arbitration agreement. Factors that increase the credibility of the
franchisor's termination threat, such as an increase in franchisee startup
costs or in the percentage of company-owned units, reduce the probability of arbitration.
Although the desire to reduce dispute resolution costs is an obvious
motivation to commit to arbitration, the results here suggest that deterrence issues matter more than dispute costs. For example, for those
franchise networks in which individual units enjoy a relatively high degree of repeat business, an increase in network size is associated with a
reduction in the probability of arbitration. This suggests that among
these franchises, the desire to reduce dispute costs is not strong enough
to induce them to forgo the governance benefits already provided by
courts.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper demonstrates the importance of deterrence concerns in the
decision of contracting parties to choose to resolve their disputes in
arbitration rather than through litigation. The hypothesis examined is
that contracting parties will choose the dispute resolution forum in which
the difference between deterrence benefits, defined as avoided harms net
of avoidance costs, and dispute resolution costs is the largest. The results
support this hypothesis and provide an illustration of the importance of
deterrence factors. Indeed, this has to be viewed as the central contribution of this paper, since everyone knows that contracting parties have
an incentive to minimize dispute resolution costs. This is the first empirical analysis to demonstrate the relative importance of deterrence
factors in the decision to choose a dispute resolution forum. The results
suggest that deterrence concerns play the dominant role in this decision.
The importance of deterrence concerns has several implications for
public policy issues, which we will only briefly mention here. First, there
is a common view that arbitration involves a weaker party selling his
legal rights to a stronger party (repeat-player firm), sometimes in a coercive setting. The coercion claim is weak in the franchising context,
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since the both parties are businesses that consult with lawyers. Moreover,
the parties have a mutual incentive to choose the dispute resolution
forum that delivers the greatest deterrence benefit per dollar invested in
dispute resolution. Arbitration may weaken some legal rights, if viewed
as rights to sue in court, and enhance others, as when the arbitration
regime provides the more accurate forum for dispute resolution. In any
event, the overall result should enhance the welfare of both contracting
parties.
There is also a common view that firms use arbitration to avoid the
application of mandatory laws. The results here are inconsistent with
this view. Franchisors located in states with franchisee protection statutes
have less demand for arbitration than other franchisors, which does not
support the claim that businesses seek arbitration in order to evade the
effects of mandatory laws. We hypothesize that franchisors have responded to the deterrence-diluting effect of protection statutes by substituting toward explicit contractual terms.
Finally, the importance of deterrence concerns suggests that laws that
make arbitration less attractive, such as franchisee protection statutes,
have substantial wealth effects. Such statutes not only raise the costs of
dispute resolution, but they also reduce the governance benefits associated with a contract. Since the governance benefits affect such day-today matters as the quality of output and the level of effort, the total
costs of protection statutes are likely to be far larger than their effects
on dispute resolution costs.
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